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Revealed Preference with Limited Consideration†
By Thomas Demuynck and Christian Seel*
We derive revealed preference tests for models where individuals use 
consideration sets to simplify their consumption problem. Our basic 
test provides necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency of 
observed choices with the existence of consideration set restrictions. 
The same conditions can also be derived from a model in which the 
consideration set formation is endogenous and based on subjective 
prices. By imposing restrictions on these subjective prices, we obtain 
additional refined revealed preference tests. We illustrate and com-
pare the performance of our tests by means of a dataset on household 
consumption choices. (JEL D11, D12, M31)
Choosing is difficult, especially if the set of available alternatives is large or if the alternatives are difficult to compare. A possible approach to simplify the 
decision problem is to first narrow down the set of all options into a smaller “con-
sideration set” and then make an optimal choice from this reduced set. Many studies 
in the marketing and psychology literatures provide strong evidence for such a “con-
sider then choose” decision process.1 In this paper, we develop revealed preference 
tests for different models of choice behavior with consideration sets. We use data 
from a large homescan consumer dataset on household grocery purchases in order 
to evaluate the empirical performance of the different models. The models based on 
consideration sets have positive predictive success and they outperform the model 
without consideration set restrictions.
Revealed preference analysis started with the seminal contributions of Samuelson 
(1938) and Houthakker (1950), and was further extended by Afriat (1967), Diewert 
(1973), and Varian (1982). A key axiom in revealed preference theory is the 
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference, abbreviated as GARP. GARP provides 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a finite dataset on prices and quantities to 
be consistent with the neo-classical model of utility maximizing behavior. In this 
canonical model, individuals consider all bundles in their budget set and choose a 
bundle that is best according to their utility function.
1 See Roberts and Lattin (1997) for an overview. 
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In many microeconomic consumption datasets, e.g., scanner datasets like the one 
we use in our empirical application, it is found that consumers limit their purchases 
to a small subset of the set of all available goods. This behavior satisfies GARP if 
the decision maker buys none of the other goods because it is utility maximizing for 
her to do so.
An alternative explanation is that the purchased quantities of some goods are zero 
because these goods were not considered by the decision maker. Indeed, in a con-
sumer theory setup, it is natural to assume that at a fundamental level what is being 
considered or not considered are goods and not bundles.2 Accordingly, a consumer 
who considers to buy a good chooses the quantity of this good, but she might fail 
to consider some goods altogether. The consumed quantity of these non-considered 
goods is zero. If consumers form consideration sets, the observed choice behavior 
may actually fail to satisfy GARP, although the choices are still optimal given her 
consideration sets. The main aim of this paper is to provide revealed preference tests 
that take into account this explanation.
Unfortunately, for real life datasets, consideration sets are not observable.3 Thus, 
given the observed choice data, we ask whether it is possible to construct consider-
ations sets of goods such that observed behavior is optimal for these sets. We solve 
this problem by providing a new revealed preference axiom, the Limited Axiom of 
Revealed Preference (LARP). Essentially, LARP boils down to verifying GARP on 
a partition of the original dataset, where the partition is determined by the goods 
having strictly positive consumption. LARP provides a set of necessary and suffi-
cient conditions for consistency of choice behavior when taking into account the 
presence of consideration sets.
Although LARP allows for the existence of consideration sets that determine 
which goods can be purchased in positive amounts, this basic consideration set 
model is agnostic about how consideration sets are formed. Therefore, we comple-
ment this basic model with a procedural model of consideration set formation in 
which the consumer also considers goods rather than bundles at the fundamental 
level.
In an initial stage, the consumer maximizes utility based on some subjective 
prices rather than the actual prices.4 She writes down a list of goods that she intends 
to buy given these subjective prices (i.e., a shopping list). The initial consideration 
set consists of all goods on the list. Thus, the consumer might not consider to buy 
some goods because she overestimates their prices.
In the second stage, the consumer goes to the shop and learns the true prices of 
the goods in this consideration set. Thus, the subjective prices for the goods in the 
consideration set are updated to the true prices.5 Given these updated prices, the 
decision maker may find it optimal to update her consideration set, i.e., she may 
2 The same perspective is taken in the marketing literature, e.g., see Roberts and Lattin (1997). 
3 However, see Ben-Akiva and Boccara (1995) who use questionnaire data for the perceived consideration sets 
in a discrete choice setting with three alternatives; for an econometric approach to brand-choice probabilities based 
on estimated consideration sets for a small number of alternatives, see also Mehta, Rajiv, and Srinivasan (2003). 
4 There is plenty of evidence on the existence and importance of subjective prices in the marketing literature; 
see, among others, Monroe (1973), Kalyanaram and Winer (1995), Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha (2005). 
5 The marketing literature also contains models in which the true prices of goods in the consideration set are 
learned and compared to expected prices; see, for example, Bronnenberg and Vonhonacker (1996). 
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introduce new goods that she would like to buy. For instance, if a good is much more 
expensive than expected, the consumer might purchase less of the good and/or look 
for a substitute good. In this case, she learns the true prices of these new goods and 
she may again choose to update her consideration set. This process continues until 
the decision maker no longer desires to update her consideration set. In the end, 
for all goods in the consideration set, the subjective prices correspond to the actual 
prices but for goods outside the consideration set, subjective prices may deviate 
from true prices.
Without any restrictions on the initial subjective prices, the procedural model 
is shown to be empirically indistinguishable from the basic model. We proceed 
by imposing two different types of restrictions on the initial subjective prices. 
The first refined model measures the mistake in the subjective price perception by 
comparing the minimal distance between subjective and true prices such that the 
observed behavior is consistent with the procedural model of consideration set 
formation. Conceptually, this model contributes to the literature on nearly optimal 
behavior (Afriat 1973). The second refined model endogeneizes the formation 
of price expectations. To do so, we adapt a simple model from the marketing 
literature to our setup.6 In this model, subjective prices are formed based on pre-
viously observed prices. We provide revealed preference tests for both refined 
models.
We provide an empirical application where we implement and test the perfor-
mance of the different models by means of a large household homescan dataset. 
Our models are nested in the sense that a household that satisfies GARP also 
satisfies both refined models and a household that satisfies a refined model also 
satisfies LARP. Thus, to obtain a reasonable comparison, we compute a measure 
of predictive success that relates the pass rate and the power (Selten 1991). All 
models based on consideration sets have positive predictive success and out-
perform the standard GARP test. In this sense, limited consideration models 
appear to provide a better fit of observed consumer behavior. In addition, we find 
that the empirical fit is higher for households with fewer members. A possible 
explanation for these findings could be that multimember households use a differ-
ent decision-making model instead of the utility maximization model maintained 
in this paper.
Currently, there is no universally accepted theory of consideration set formation. 
We think that a revealed preference approach provides a natural environment to 
study this topic. Our paper provides some evidence in favor of consideration set 
formation with endogenous subjective prices. In this sense, we hope that it provides 
inspiration for more empirical research on the topic.
Related Literature.—First, our paper is related to a growing literature in econom-
ics that takes into account choice behavior with consideration sets; see, among others, 
Eliaz and Spiegler (2011); Caplin, Dean, and Martin (2011); Manzini and Mariotti 
(2012); Masatlioglu, Nakajima, and Ozbay (2012); Masatlioglu and Nakajima 
6 The marketing literature contains a myriad of models of price formation; for an overview, see Lowengart 
(2002). 
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(2013); Tyson (2013); and Manzini and Mariotti (2014). Most of these papers use 
a choice theoretic framework where choice sets are assumed to be  discrete, i.e., 
individuals choose from a finite set of alternatives. In this paper, we  consider consid-
eration set formation for a model with continuous choice and we look at its testable 
implications from a revealed preference perspective à la Afriat.
Second, this paper is related to several papers on revealed preference theory 
with nonstandard budget sets; see, among others, Forges and Minelli (2009) 
and Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2013). In our paper, quantities of goods outside 
the consideration set are by definition equal to zero. Thus, budget sets can be 
restricted to lie in a certain linear subspace of the full budget set. In addition to 
some technical differences,7 Forges and Minelli (2009) and Nishimura, Ok, and 
Quah (2013) assume that the (nonlinear) budget sets for the different choice situ-
ations are known. In our setting, however, the budget set is not completely known 
since the consideration set is not observable. In this sense, our analysis not only 
deals with having a nonstandard constraint set, but moreover this set is not known 
a priori.
Finally, independently of our work, Crawford and Polisson (2015) apply revealed 
preference theory to datasets in which prices are not observed for goods that are 
consumed with zero quantities. They obtain a revealed preference condition that 
has the same testable implications as one part of our characterization for the basic 
model; for the precise relation, see the discussion at the end of Section II. The focus 
and analysis in Crawford and Polisson (2015) is quite different from the present 
paper. Their main target is on how to deal with missing prices for prediction and 
welfare analysis. On the other hand, we provide a theory of bounded rationality with 
a sequential process of consideration set formation.
Section I contains a short introduction to revealed preference theory. Section II 
presents the revealed preference characterization for the basic limited consider-
ation model. In Section III, we describe the procedural revealed preference model 
where the decision maker bases her consumption decision on her subjective prices. 
Section IV contains the empirical application. Finally, Section V concludes. Most 
proofs are in the Appendix.
I. Revealed Preference
The basic ingredient of revealed preference theory is a finite dataset on prices 
and quantities. Datasets are denoted by  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T , where  T is a finite set of 
observations,  p t =  [ p t 1 , … ,  p t n ] is a row vector of strictly positive prices, and 
 q t =  [ q t 1 , … ,  q t n ] ′ is a column vector of nonnegative consumption quantities for 
the  n different goods. A dataset reflects the observed purchase behavior  q t for a 
decision maker who faces prices  p t at observation  t .
7 Forges and Minelli (2009) requires that each (nonlinear) budget set contains at least one strictly positive 
bundle (see their Lemma 1), which is clearly not the case for settings with consideration sets. In contrast to our 
Theorem 2, neither Forges and Minelli (2009) nor Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2013) guarantee a rationalization by 
a concave utility function. 
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DEFINITION 1: A dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T is rationalizable if there exists a (locally 
non-satiated) utility function  u :  핉 n → 핉 and for all observations  t ∈ T , there 
exists an expenditure level  m t ≥ 0 such that
  q t ∈  arg max 
q
   u(q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t . 
In words, a dataset is rationalizable if the chosen bundles,  q t , are consistent with 
the model of utility maximization subject to a linear budget constraint.
The bundle  q t is directly revealed preferred to the bundle  q v if  p t  q t ≥  p t  q v , i.e., 
the bundle  q t was at least as costly as the bundle  q v at observation  t . We write this 
as  q t R q v . The indirect revealed preference relation  R T is the transitive closure of the 
relation  R , i.e.,  q t  R T  q v if there exists a (possibly empty) sequence  r, s, … , w of 
observations in  T such that  q t R q r ,  q r R  q s , … ,  q w R q v . The dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T 
satisfies the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if for all  q t  R T  q v it 
is not the case that  p v  q v >  p v  q t ; if  q t is indirectly revealed preferred to  q v it is not 
the case that  q v was purchased although  q t was less expensive.
In a seminal contribution to the literature, Afriat (1967) showed that GARP is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability.
THEOREM 1 (Afriat’s Theorem): consider a dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T . Then the 
following are equivalent:
 (i)  s is rationalizable by a locally non-satiated utility function.
 (ii)  s satisfies GARP.
 (iii) For all observations  t ∈ T , there exist numbers  ϕ t and  λ t > 0 such that for 
all observations  t, v ∈ T ,
    ϕ t −  ϕ v ≤  λ v  p v ( q t −  q v ). 
 (iv)  s is rationalizable by a strictly monotone and concave utility function.
The linear inequalities in condition (iii) are called the Afriat inequalities. In order to 
grasp the intuition behind these inequalities, let us assume that the dataset is ratio-
nalizable by a utility function that is concave, strictly monotone, and differentiable. 
Then, by concavity, we obtain that for all observations  t, v ∈ T ,
  u( q t ) − u( q v ) ≤  ∑ 
i=1
n
  ∂ u( q v ) _____∂ q i  ( q t 
i −  q v i). 
From the first-order conditions of the utility maximization problem, we also have that
  
∂ u( q v ) _____∂ q i  =  λ v  p v 
i if  q v i > 0,
  ∂ u( q v ) _____∂ q i  ≤  λ v  p v 
i if  q v i = 0, 
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where  λ t is the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint. Substituting this 
first-order condition into the concavity restriction and setting  ϕ t = u( q t ) and 
 ϕ v = u( q v ) gives
  ϕ t −  ϕ v ≤  λ v  p v ( q t −  q v ). 
Thus, the Afriat inequalities provide us with an estimate of the utility levels 
 ϕ t = u( q t ) and marginal utility of income levels  λ t at the different observations.
II. Limited Consideration
In this section, we present a model of decision making based on consideration 
sets. In order to keep the analysis as general as possible, we abstain from placing any 
restriction on how consideration sets are formed.
Consider a decision maker with a strictly monotone utility function  u :  핉 + n → 핉 .8 
At each observation  t , the decision maker decides on her consumption bundle  q t 
over the set of goods  G = {1, … , n} . However, if she goes to the shop to purchase 
her bundle, she does not always take all goods into consideration.
More precisely, at each observation  t , she only considers a subset  i t ⊆ G of 
goods. The set  i t is called her consideration set at observation  t . It contains all goods 
that the decision maker considers for positive consumption, i.e., the consumption 
of each good outside this consideration set is equal to zero. For the goods in her 
consideration set, however, the decision maker chooses the quantities that maximize 
her utility. Formally, at each observation  t , the decision maker faces the constrained 
optimization problem
  max 
q
   u(q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t ,
  q i = 0 ∀i ∉  i t ,
where  m t is the total disposable income at observation  t . Observe that there might 
be some goods  j ∈  i t for which  q j = 0 . In words, it is possible that the decision 
maker considers some good  j , but finds it optimal not to buy it.
DEFINITION 2: A dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T is rationalizable with limited consid-
eration if there exists a strictly monotone utility function  u :  핉 + n → 핉 and for all 
t ∈ T , there exist incomes  m t and consideration sets  i t ⊆ G such that
  q t ∈  arg max 
q
   u(q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t ,
  q i = 0 ∀i ∉  i t .
8 The strengthening from local non-satiation to strict monotonicity is necessary in the limited consideration 
framework because local non-satiation is not sufficient to guarantee that the budget constraint is binding. 
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Definition 2 differs from Definition 1, since we introduce additional constraints 
based on the consideration sets  i t , but allow for some freedom in choosing the con-
sideration sets. Note that Definition 2 is weaker, since it boils down to Definition 1 
for the special case where  i t = G .
For a dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T and an observation  t ∈ T , let us denote by  J t the 
subset of goods for which the corresponding elements of  q t are nonzero, i.e., the set 
of goods that have strictly positive components in  q t :
  J t = {i ∈ G |  q t i > 0}. 
If the dataset is rationalizable with limited consideration, then we know that  J t ⊆  i t : 
if some good is consumed, then it must be in the consideration set. The following 
lemma shows that there is no loss in generality by assuming that  i t =  J t .
LEMMA 1: A dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T is rationalizable with limited consideration 
if and only if it is rationalizable with limited consideration using the consideration 
sets  i t =  J t .
Let us partition the set of observations  T according to the equivalence classes gen-
erated by the sets  J t . Two observations  t and  v are in the same element of the par-
tition if and only if  J t =  J v . Let us denote this partition by  ℰ s . Observe that  ℰ s is 
unique. The partition  ℰ s partitions the set of observations  T and therefore the dataset 
 s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T into sub-datasets  s E =  { p t ,  q t } t∈E , where  E ∈  ℰ s . This motivates 
the following definition.
DEFINITION 3: The dataset  s satisfies the Limited Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(LARP) if each sub-dataset  s E satisfies GARP.
We obtain the following main result.
THEOREM 2: consider a dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T . The following statements are 
equivalent:
 (i)  s is rationalizable with limited consideration by a strictly monotone utility 
function.
 (ii)  s satisfies LARP.
 (iii) For all  t ∈ T , there exist numbers  ϕ t ,  λ t > 0 and vectors  P t ∈  핉 ++ n such 
that for all  t, v ,
     ϕ t −  ϕ v ≤  λ v  ∑ 
i∈ J v 
 p v i  ( q t i −  q v i) +  λ v  ∑ 
i∉ J v 
 P v i  ( q t i −  q v i) .
 (iv) There exist vectors  P t ∈  핉 ++ n such that  { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP and for all 
t ∈ T and  i ∈ G , if  q t i > 0 , then  P t i =  p t i .
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 (v)  s is rationalizable with limited consideration by a concave and strictly mono-
tone utility function.
Let us provide some intuition for Theorem 2.
The equivalence between (i) and (ii) shows that rationalizability with limited 
consideration is equivalent to LARP. This result might seem a bit surprising, since 
LARP does not impose any restriction on observations that have different goods 
with strictly positive consumption, i.e., where  J t ≠  J v . However, LARP entails a 
lot of freedom in choosing prices for goods with zero consumption. This allows us 
to show that in order to find violations of LARP, we can restrict attention to obser-
vation for which  J t is the same.
Condition (iii) gives an equivalence in terms of Afriat-type inequalities. The only 
difference between these inequalities and the ones in Theorem 1 is that for the goods 
outside  J v , the prices  p v j are replaced by some (unobserved) prices  P v j . These prices 
correspond to the possible values of the marginal willingness to pay of the decision 
maker for an increase in the consumption of good  j at observation  t . In the model 
without consideration sets, utility maximization requires that this marginal willing-
ness to pay for a good is equal to the marginal cost  p v j for  q v j > 0 , i.e.,  j ∈  J v or is 
less than or equal to  p v j if  q v j = 0 , i.e.,  j ∉  J v . When consideration sets are taken 
into account, however, these marginal utilities can also be higher than the prices  p v j 
for goods outside the consideration set.
Condition (iv) is an equivalent statement in terms of GARP for the entire dataset, 
where the price vectors  p t are replaced by the vectors  P t . These prices are allowed to 
deviate from the true prices for goods that have zero consumption. The equivalence 
between (iii) and (iv) follows immediately from the equivalence between (ii) and 
(iii) in Theorem 1.
An alternative interpretation for condition (iv) is that the decision maker solves 
the same utility maximization model as in Section I, but uses the price vector  P t 
instead of the true price vector  p t . The next section further explores this idea of  P t as 
subjective prices in order to propose a model of consideration set formation.
Finally, let us compare our Theorem 2 to the result in Crawford and Polisson 
(2015). They look at the problem of missing prices: if a certain good is not con-
sumed, then expenditures for this good are zero. Thus, the price level (per unit) 
of this good cannot be identified. Given this missing prices problem, they ask the 
following question: “what are the necessary and sufficient conditions, such that we 
can construct prices for these non-consumed goods, such that the observed purchase 
behavior is consistent with utility maximizing behavior, i.e., for the non-consumed 
goods, it is utility maximizing to choose a consumption level of zero.” Crawford and 
Polisson (2015) demonstrate that this problem is equivalent to the rationalizability 
of a utility maximizing model where goods with zero consumption are rationed to 
be zero (i.e., they cannot be bought at all). Intuitively, for the rationing model, we 
can replace actual prices with shadow prices for the rationed goods. Then rational-
ity requires that the consumer satisfies GARP on a dataset of prices and quantities 
where true prices (of the non-consumed goods) are replaced by these shadow prices.
In our model of consideration sets, we do not look at a problem of missing prices. 
On the other hand, with consideration sets, goods with zero consumption can either 
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be optimally chosen to be zero, or they can be zero because they are not in the con-
sideration set. If they lie outside the consideration set, this is equivalent to the model 
where the particular good is rationed at zero. Lemma 1 shows that there is no loss of 
generality in assuming that all goods with zero consumption are outside the consid-
eration set. Thus, the testable implications boil down to the rationing model where 
all goods with zero consumption amounts are rationed at zero. As such, both the 
consideration set model and the missing prices model boil down to a test of a model 
where non-consumed goods are rationed at zero. Indeed, Crawford and Polisson, 
(2015) show that a dataset is rationalizable with the missing prices model if and 
only if it satisfies condition (iii) of our Theorem 2, which provides the formal link 
between the testable implications of the two models.
III. A Model of Consideration Set Formation
In the previous section, consideration sets were exogenously determined and 
therefore beyond the control of the decision maker. In this section, we provide a 
sequential process that endogeneizes the formation of consideration sets based on 
the values of some subjective prices. The marketing literature finds a lot of evi-
dence for the importance of such subjective prices (which they call reference prices) 
in consumer decisions; see, e.g., Monroe (1973); Kalyanaram and Winer (1995); 
and Mazumdar, Ray, and Sinha (2005). By combining subjective prices with (con-
strained) utility maximization, we provide a conceptually novel, intuitive frame-
work how consideration sets are formed.
More specifically, suppose the consumer has some initial idea about the prices. 
Accordingly, she writes down a shopping list. Then, she goes to the shop, pays atten-
tion to the goods on her list, and learns their true prices. Up to this point, our model 
is still in line with the marketing literature (e.g., Bronnenberg and Vonhonacker 
1996) that now restricts attention to whether the good is chosen. In contrast, we do 
not only study whether the consumer still buys the good if the price is higher than 
expected, but also allow her to buy a lower quantity and/or look for (substitute) 
goods in this case. In this way, the consideration set might expand after learning the 
prices of some goods. This process of updating the consideration set stops when she 
decides not to consider any new goods.
To formalize this process, consider a decision maker that would like to spend her 
budget  m t on several goods. Before she goes shopping, she forms an idea about the 
bundle that she would like to buy based on some subjective idea about the prices of 
the different goods. We denote these subjective prices by  P t ∈  핉 ++ n .9 In an initial 
phase, the decision maker solves
  max 
q
   u(q) subject to  P t q ≤  m t . 
9 The case in which a consumer is completely unaware of good  i can be included in this setup by setting  P t i 
sufficiently large. 
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Let us denote by  q ̃ t the solution to this problem. Using this bundle, the decision 
maker forms an initial consideration set by collecting all goods with positive 
amounts in  q ̃ t , i.e.,
  i ̃ t = {i ∈ G |   q ̃ t i > 0}. 
Next, the decision maker goes to the shop and investigates the goods in her consid-
eration set  i ̃ t more thoroughly. Thereby, she learns about the actual prices of these 
goods. Given this updated information, her subjective prices of the goods in  i ̃ t are 
replaced by the true prices  p t i . Therefore, she now faces the maximization problem
  max 
q
   u(q) subject to  ∑ 
i∈ i ̃ t 
 p t i  q i +  ∑ 
i∉ i ̃ t 
 P t i  q i ≤  m t .
Let  
_
 qt be the optimal solution to this problem. If there are new goods  i ∉  i ̃ t for 
which  
_
 q t i > 0 , these are added to the updated consideration set  _ i t :
  
_
 i t =  i ̃ t ∪ {i ∈ G |  _ q t i > 0}. 
In a next step, she learns the true prices of the new goods in the set  
_
 i t and the opti-
mization problem becomes
  max 
q
   u (q) subject to  ∑ 
i∈ _ i t 
 p t i  q i +  ∑ 
i∉ _ i t 
 P t i  q i ≤  m t .
This process of updating the consideration set and solving the associated utility 
maximization problem is iterated until no additional goods are added to the consid-
eration set. Since the set of goods is finite and the consideration set cannot shrink, 
this procedure ends after a finite number of rounds.
The final outcome of this decision problem depends on the subjective prices  P t . 
For a good  i that never enters the consideration set, there are two possibilities. First, 
if  P t i ≤  p t i , the consumer would have chosen  q i = 0 even if she had known the true 
price. For these goods, the usual revealed preference conditions pose no problem: if 
consumption of a certain good is zero, we may always replace the price by a higher 
price without strengthening the revealed preference conditions (see also Lemma 2 
below). Second, if  P t i >  p t i , it might have been better for the consumer to include 
the good in her consideration set.
DEFINITION 4: A dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T is rationalizable with subjective prices if 
there exists a (strictly monotone) utility function  u( · ) :  핉 + n → 핉 and for all  t ∈ T , 
there exist incomes  m t , subjective prices  P t ∈  핉 ++ n , and consideration sets  i t ⊆ G 
such that for all  t ∈ T , the following two conditions hold:
 (i)  q t ∈ arg  max q  u(q) subject to  ∑ i∈ i t    p t i  q i +  ∑ i∉ i t    P t i  q i ≤  m t .
 (ii) if  i ∉  i t , then  q t i = 0 .
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This rationalizability concept coincides with the final stage in the dynamic decision 
process outlined. The first condition requires that the chosen consumption bundle  q t 
maximizes the utility given the true prices of the goods in the consideration set and 
the subjective prices for the goods outside the consideration set. The second restric-
tion ensures that the decision maker does not wish to include any additional goods 
into her consideration set.
As it turns out, the revealed preference conditions for this model are identical to 
those for the model with limited consideration presented in Section II.
COROLLARy 1: consider a dataset  s . The dataset is rationalizable with subjective 
prices if and only if it satisfies LARP.
To understand the intuition behind this Corollary, consider the equivalent for-
mulation (iv) for LARP in Theorem 2. This condition requires the existence of 
subjective prices  P t such that for all  t ∈ T ,  j ∈ G , we have  q t j > 0 implies 
 P t j =  p t j and  { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP. The GARP condition implies consistency 
with utility maximizing behavior for the prices  P t . The other condition requires 
that for goods that are consumed, the subjective prices should be equal to the true 
prices. These correspond to the two conditions required for rationalizability with 
subjective prices.
Restrictions on subjective Prices.—So far, we have abstained from imposing any 
constraints (bounds) on the values of the subjective prices  P t . In this section, we 
consider different types of restrictions. The next lemma will be useful for deriving 
the results in this section.
LEMMA 2: consider two datasets,  { P t,  q t } t∈T and  { _ Pt,  q t } t∈T , where for all 
i ∈ G, t ∈ T :
 (i) if  q t i > 0 , then  _ P t i =  P t i and
 (ii) if  q t i = 0 , then  _ P t i ≥  P t i .
if the dataset  { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP, then the dataset  { _ Pt,  q t } t∈T also satisfies 
GARP.
The lemma states that if a dataset is consistent with GARP, then any dataset that is 
obtained by increasing the prices for the goods that have zero consumption is also 
consistent with GARP. Moreover, this lemma shows that imposing lower bounds on 
the subjective prices does not generate any additional testable restrictions. As such, 
we focus our analysis on placing upper bounds.
subjective Prices Based on True Prices.—In the first model with constrained 
subjective prices, we require that the subjective prices are not too far from the true 
prices. Given some fixed number  θ ≥ 1 , we formalize this by requiring that the 
subjective prices are such that  P t ≤ θ  p t . 
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DEFINITION 5: A dataset  s is  θ -rationalizable with subjective prices constrained 
by true prices if there exists a (strictly monotone) utility function  u( · ) :  핉 + n → 핉 
and for all  t ∈ T , there exist incomes  m t , subjective prices  P t ∈  핉 ++ n , and consid-
eration sets  i t ⊆ G , such that for all  t ∈ T , the following three conditions hold:
 (i)  q t ∈ arg  max q  u (q) subject to  ∑ i∈ i t    p t i  q i +  ∑ i∉ i t    P t i  q i ≤  m t .
 (ii)  P t i ≤ θ  p t i  ∀i ∉  i t .
 (iii) if  i ∉  i t , then  q t i = 0 .
The following theorem characterizes the datasets that are rationalizable in this sense.
THEOREM 3: consider a dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T . The following statements are 
equivalent:
 (i) The dataset  s is  θ -rationalizable with subjective prices constrained by true 
prices.
 (ii) The dataset  s satisfies  θ -LARP-T, i.e., there exist prices  P t ∈  핉 ++ n such that { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP and for all  t ∈ T and  j ∈ G ,
    P t j =  { 
 p 
t
 j  if  q t 
j > 0  θ  p 
t
 j  if  q 
t
 j = 0 .
It is easy to see that (ii) implies (i). The fact that (i) implies (ii) is a conse-
quence of Lemma 2. If  q t i = 0 , there are two cases: either  i ∈  i t , in which case 
 P t i =  p t i , or  i ∉  i t , in which case  P t i ≤ θ  p t i . As we do not know which case is the 
true one, we may take the highest value since this gives the weaker revealed pref-
erence restriction.
The parameter  θ can either be chosen ex ante or determined as the smallest value 
of  θ for which a dataset is still rationalizable (if the dataset satisfies LARP). This 
critical value of  θ , which we call the subjective price index (SPI), minimizes the 
(proportional) difference between the observed true prices  p v i and the subjective 
price  P v i that is necessary to rationalize the dataset. It can be found using a simple 
binary search algorithm. If the SPI is close to one, then the dataset can be rational-
ized by a model where the subjective prices are very close to the actual prices, i.e., 
the dataset is close to satisfying GARP. If the SPI is large, we need to allow for 
subjective prices that are far from the actual ones.
Adaptive subjective Prices.—The previous model provides a test of how wrong 
the price expectations have to be such that behavior can be explained as optimal 
under the consideration set approach. However, it does not provide a procedure for 
how these prices are formed. The marketing literature proposes a myriad of price 
formation models; see Lowengart (2002) for an overview. We adapt a simple model 
in which subjective prices are formed on the basis of last observed price of the good 
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to our setting. As Gabor (1977) argues, “The price of the last purchase as remem-
bered represents the price image of the good concerned, and it can be of great impor-
tance to the price setter to know how it compares with the actual price, since this will 
indicate how the market will respond to a price adjustment.”
To formalize this idea, assume that a certain good was in the consideration set at 
some time in the past. At that time, the subjective price was equal to the true price. 
Assuming adaptive subjective prices, the decision maker takes the last price she 
observed as the current subjective price. In order to formalize this setting, consider 
for any good  j and observation  t , the value  ℓ( j, t) , where
  ℓ( j, t) =  { max{k ∈ T | k ≤ t, j ∈  i k } if j ∈  ∪ k≤t 
   i k     
0
 
if j ∉  ∪ k≤t   i k  .
The value of  ℓ( j, t) gives the last period where good  j was in the consideration set. 
Observe that if good  j is in  i t , then  ℓ( j, t) = t . Of course, it is possible that  j was in 
no consideration set before observation  t . In this case  ℓ( j, t) is set to zero.
We assume that the subjective prices about good  j in period  t are such that
  P t  j =  p ℓ( j, t) j if ℓ( j, t) > 0. 
On the other hand, if  j was not previously purchased, i.e.,  ℓ( j, t) = 0 , we impose 
no restrictions on the subjective prices  P t j .
DEFINITION 6: A dataset  s is rationalizable with adaptive subjective prices if there 
exists a (strictly monotone) utility function  u( · ) :  핉 + n → 핉 and for all  t ∈ T , there 
exist incomes  m t , subjective prices  P t ∈  핉 ++ n , and consideration sets  i t ⊆ G , such 
that for all  t ∈ T ,
 (i)  q t ∈ arg  max q  u (q) subject to  ∑ i∈ i t    p t i  q i +  ∑ i∉ i t    P t i  q i ≤  m t .
 (ii)  P t i =  p ℓ(i, t) i if ℓ(i, t) > 0 .
 (iii) if  i ∉  i t , then  q t i = 0 .
Toward the revealed preference characterization, define  l( j, t) as
  l( j, t) =  { max{k ∈ T | k ≤ t,  q k 
j > 0} if j ∈  ∪ k≤t   J k  
0
 
if j ∉  ∪ k≤t   J k .
The function  l( j, t) gives the last observation prior or equal to  t where good  j was 
consumed with strictly positive amount. If good  j was not consumed prior to obser-
vation  t , we set  l( j, t) equal to zero. Observe that if  q t j > 0 , then  l( j, t) = t and 
that  ℓ( j, t) ≥ l( j, t) . If  l( j, t) > 0 , this follows from the fact that  j ∈  i l( j, t) . If 
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l( j, t) = 0 , this inequality is trivially satisfied. Using the definition of  l( j, t) , we 
can now state the revealed preference result.
THEOREM 4: consider a dataset  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T . The following statements are 
equivalent:
 (i) The dataset  s is rationalizable with adaptive subjective prices.
 (ii) The dataset  s satisfies LARP-AP, i.e., there exist subjective prices  P t ∈  핉 ++ n 
such that  { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP and for all  t ∈ T ,  j ∈ G ,
    P t j =  { ma x v | t≥v≥l( j, t)  p v 
j
 
if l( j, t) > 0  
unrestricted
 
if l( j, t) = 0 .
Again, the implication from (i) to (ii) follows from Lemma 2. If  l( j, t) > 0 , we 
know that  j ∈  i l( j, t) , i.e.,  j was in the consideration set at observation  l( j, t) . Also, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that  j was in any other consideration set after 
l( j, t) . Thus, we take the subjective price to be the highest price over all observations 
v for which  l( j, t) ≤ v ≤ t . In particular, if  l( j, t) = t , i.e.,  q 
t
  j > 0 , we obtain 
P 
t
 j =  p 
t
 j .
IV. Application
We illustrate our results using data from ACNielsens Homescan Panel from the 
Denver area, a large homescan dataset. The dataset captures a wide variety of gro-
cery packed goods purchased by a large number of households at a large number 
of retail shops. It covers the period January 1993 through March 1995. The data-
set is designed to be representative of the Denver metropolitan area. Households 
are equipped with an electronic home scanning unit. After every shopping trip, the 
shopper scans the UPC (Unique Product Code) of all purchased goods and registers 
the date. Given the UPC, it is possible to match the purchased goods with price 
information for the stores within the area. The full dataset consists of 2,100 separate 
households and over 950,000 transactions. A more detailed description of the data-
set can be found in Aguiar and Hurst (2007).10
We aggregate the purchase data to monthly aggregates. Shorter time frames could 
lead to situations where purchases of one period may be stored and consumed in 
another period. Longer periods seem unnecessary since we focus on nondurable 
grocery purchases. We assume that grocery purchases are separable in the utility 
function from all other goods and services.
We define a good on the basis of the UPC. As such, each purchase in the dataset 
with a different UPC is seen as the purchase of a different good. For every shopping 
trip and each good bought, every household specifies the amount bought and price 
10 See also Dean and Martin (2016) for another use of the same dataset for revealed preference tests. 
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paid. As such, we define per unit prices for these goods by dividing total expenditure 
on this UPC (over the month) by the total quantity bought. However, the dataset 
has a lot of missing prices. If a household does not buy a specific good in a certain 
month, we do not know the price for this good. In order to minimize the number of 
missing prices, we look if there was any other household that bought this good in 
the same period. If so, we take the average price paid by these other households as 
the relevant price. In this way, we try to minimize the number of missing prices.11 
Given the minor level of aggregation, most goods are actually purchased in discrete 
amounts. This does not immediately fit our framework where quantities are assumed 
to be continuous. However, Polisson and Quah (2013) recently showed that even in 
a discrete goods framework, the usual revealed preference conditions hold if utility 
is separable in the observed goods and an unobserved numeraire good, which is 
infinitely divisible (e.g., money).
Households are observed up to 27 months. This gives us a maximum of 27 obser-
vations per household. We use the panel structure in the dataset to verify the revealed 
preference restrictions for each household separately. We further restrict our panel to 
households for which we have consumption and relevant price data over all 27 obser-
vations. This leaves us with a total of 550 households. We refer to Appendix C for a 
detailed account of our data cleaning procedure.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics on the dataset. On average, over the 
27  months, a household purchases around 30.57 different goods although there 
is considerable variation among households. Further, on average 84 percent of all 
quantities (good-observation pairs) are zero, which means that the consumption data 
is quite sparse. As mentioned in the introduction, there might be several reasons why 
quantities might be zero. In particular, consumers might either find it optimal not to 
consume certain goods or those the goods were not in their consideration set. Our 
GARP/LARP tests allow us to separately test these two hypotheses.
Pass Rates.—A first metric to evaluate the different revealed preference tests is 
the pass rate. The pass rate gives the percentage of all households that are consistent 
with the revealed preference test under consideration. Table 2 provides the results. 
The pass rate for the GARP test is 5.3 percent, which is quite low. On the other hand, 
the pass rate for the LARP test (97.8 percent) is close to unity implying that nearly 
all households are consistent with utility maximizing behavior if we allow for the 
presence of consideration sets. However, one must be cautious. When we look at 
the size of the partitions that are induced by the LARP test, we see that there are on 
average 7.74 equivalence classes per household. In other words, the high pass rate of 
LARP is mainly due to the fact that people tend to buy new goods and stop buying 
other goods quite frequently. Table 2 also gives the pass rates for rationalizability 
with subjective prices for various values of  θ . This pass rate ranges from 66 percent 
(for  θ = 1.25 ) to 97 percent (for  θ = 2.25 ). Given that the revealed preference 
test becomes weaker as  θ increases, the pass rate cannot decrease. We omitted the 
11 In order to obtain reliable price data, we omit goods for which the total “aggregate” quantity bought (over all 
households) is below 20 for some month. 
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results for  θ = 1 as this test coincides with the usual GARP test. Finally, the pass 
rate for rationalizability with adaptive subjective prices is about 61 percent.
Power and Predictive success.—The different revealed preference tests are nested 
in the sense that, for example, a dataset that passes GARP automatically satisfies 
LARP or any other revealed preference test. The tests that impose more structure on 
the subjective prices are stronger than LARP, so their pass rates cannot be higher. 
In this sense, it is unreasonable to compare the performance of the different models 
solely on the basis of the pass rates. In order to account for the nestedness of the 
different models, it is crucial to perform a power analysis. Intuitively, the power of 
a revealed preference model is given by the probability of rejecting the model when 
this model is not the true data generating process.
Usually, the power is computed using Bronars’ (1987) procedure. This procedure 
computes the probability that a revealed preference test rejects seemingly irrational 
(or random) behavior based on the model of irrational behavior from Becker (1962). 
Table 1—Summary Statistics
Number of households 550
Fraction zero consumption observations 0.84
(0.048)
Number of distinct goods per household 30.57
(10.69)
Note: Sample standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2—Pass Rates, Power, and Predictive Success
Test Pass rate Power Predictive success 95% CI
GARP 0.0527 0.9484 0.0011  [− 0.0178, 0.0200] (0.2237) (0.1297) (0.2263)
LARP 0.9782 0.0672 0.0454  [0.0311, 0.0596] (0.1462) (0.1647) (0.1702)
 θ -LARP-T
 θ = 1.25 0.6618 0.3830 0.0448  [0.0117, 0.0780] (0.4735) (0.3094) (0.3969)
 θ = 1.5 0.8873 0.1791 0.0664  [0.0430, 0.0898] (0.3165) (0.2384) (0.2803)
 θ = 1.75 0.9473 0.1212 0.0684  [0.0489, 0.0880] (0.2237) (0.1981) (0.2336)
 θ = 2 0.9655 0.0992 0.0646  [0.0478, 0.0815] (0.1828) (0.1812) (0.2020)
 θ = 2.25 0.9709 0.0901 0.0610  [0.0452, 0.0768] (0.1682) (0.1753) (0.1892)
LARP-AP 0.6091 0.4512 0.0603  [0.0275, 0.0931] (0.4884) (0.3320) (0.3928)
Notes: Pass rate, power, predictive success, and 95 percent asymptotic confidence intervals for 
the predictive success for the various revealed preference tests. Sample standard deviations for 
the different measures are between brackets.
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In order to compute the Bronars power of a certain dataset for a specific revealed 
preference test one first generates a large number of random datasets. Each of these 
random datasets is obtained by drawing for each observation  t ∈ T a random con-
sumption bundle uniformly from the budget hyperplane at observation  t (i.e., for 
prices  p t and income  m t =  p t  q t ). The power is then determined by the proportion 
of these randomly generated datasets that fail the revealed preference test. A higher 
power therefore means that less randomly generated datasets pass the revealed pref-
erence test.12
Computing the Bronars power in our setting is a bit problematic. Given that the 
random consumption bundles for the Bronars power are drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution on the budget hyperplane, the probability of generating zero consumption 
quantities is zero. For such datasets (where  q 
t
 j > 0 for all  t and  j ), all tests coincide 
with the usual GARP test. Thus, all models have the same Bronars power.
In order to alleviate this problem, we propose a modified power measure that 
takes into account the large frequency of zero consumption quantities in the data-
sets. Instead of drawing uniform bundles from the entire budget hyperplanes, we 
draw uniform bundles from the sub-hyperplane generated by the nonzero consump-
tion bundles in the vector  q t . In other words, all randomly generated bundles are 
restricted to have zero consumption quantities for the goods in  G that also have zero 
consumption in the vector  q t . For each of the 550 households, we generate 1,000 
such random datasets. The power for a certain household is then computed as the 
proportion of these datasets that fail the corresponding revealed preference test. The 
mean of the power results are given in Table 2. Of course, stronger revealed prefer-
ence tests have higher power given that they reject a larger fraction of the randomly 
generated datasets.
As can be seen from Table 2, the pass rates and power of the various models are 
inversely related, i.e., low power is associated with higher pass rates and vice versa. 
The next step is to combine the two performance measures into a single index such 
that they can be used as a reliable criterion for comparing different but possibly 
nested models. We do this by using the measure of predictive success introduced 
by Selten (1991) and popularized for use in revealed preference analysis by Beatty 
and Crawford (2011). Predictive success can be directly calculated as the difference 
between the pass rate and one minus the power:
  Predictive success = Pass rate − (1 − Power) .
The pass rate measures the percentage of households that satisfy a certain revealed 
preference test. One minus the power measures the percentage of randomly gener-
ated datasets that satisfy the same revealed preference test. In other words, it gives 
the expected pass rate if behavior is random. As such, the difference determines 
how much actual behavior agrees better with the revealed preference test compared 
to what is expected if behavior is random. Negative predictive success values—low 
pass rate combined with low power—suggest that the revealed preference test is 
12 See Andreoni, Gillen, and Harbaugh (2013) for various alternative procedures to compute the power of a 
revealed preference test. 
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inadequate for describing observed consumer behavior, since it is at least as good at 
explaining random behavior. On the other hand, positive predictive success—high 
pass rate combined with high power—points to a potentially useful model that is 
able to reject irrational behavior while explaining observed behavior.
The predictive success is given in the third column of Table 2. The last column 
gives the 95 percent asymptotic confidence intervals. All models have predictive 
success measures that are larger than zero, which means that they outperform the 
model that is based on random behavior. However, the predictive success for the 
GARP model is not statistically significantly different from 0 at the 5 percent con-
fidence level. The model with subjective prices, where  θ = 1.75 , has the highest 
predictive success. Appendix B contains details on the statistical significance of the 
differences in predictive success between the various models. From this, we see that 
GARP performs worst in terms of predictive success. The difference between the 
predictive success of GARP and any other model is negative (at the 5 percent level). 
In addition, we see that the predictive success of LARP is smaller than for the mod-
els with adaptive subjective prices except for  θ = 1.25 .
Goodness of Fit.—The revealed preference tests tell us whether or not a dataset 
is consistent with the particular model that is being tested. However, as argued by 
Varian (1990), in many cases, nearly optimizing behavior is just as good as optimiz-
ing behavior. In this sense, it is useful to have some indication how close a given 
dataset is to satisfying GARP when it violates the revealed preference conditions. 
Usually this is measured by using a goodness-of-fit measure. The most popular 
goodness-of-fit measure in the revealed preference literature is Afriat’s (1973) crit-
ical cost efficiency index. Intuitively, the critical cost efficiency index measures the 
amount by which each (linear) budget set must be minimally adjusted in order to 
remove all GARP violations. The left part of Figure 1 shows the kernel estimation of 
the distribution of the Afriat index for our dataset, i.e., the distribution of the critical 
cost efficiency index over the households in the sample that violate GARP. We see 
that the distribution is highly skewed towards one with a peak around 0.95.
In Section III, we discussed a similar index, the subjective price index (SPI), as 
the smallest value of  θ for which a dataset passes  θ -LARP-T. The SPI minimizes 
the (proportional) difference between the observed prices and the subjective prices 
that are necessary for the dataset to be rationalizable. The closer the SPI to one, the 
closer the dataset is to satisfying GARP. The distribution of this value is shown in 
panel B of Figure 1. For this, we restricted our data to those households that satisfy 
LARP but violate GARP. We see that the distribution is heavily skewed towards one 
with a peak around 1.1. The SPI and the Afriat critical cost efficiency index turn out 
to be highly correlated (−0.443),13 although the underlying motivation behind the 
two measures is vastly different.
Observable Heterogeneity.—As a final exercise, we investigate whether the 
predictive success of the different models and the SPI are related to observable 
13 This correlation is statistically different from 0 at the 1 percent level. 
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heterogeneity by means of a linear regression on several observable household char-
acteristics. Our first characteristic, pshopage, is the age of the household member 
who goes shopping. We choose this variable instead of the variable of the age for 
the husband and wife separately because this variable is continuously measured. 
Next, female college and male college are dummy variables that equal one if the 
corresponding household member has at least a college degree. Further, income is a 
dummy variable that equals one if the household (yearly) income is above $50,000. 
The variable hhsize measures the size of the household. Finally, the variable conc 
measures to what extent the shopping was done by the same person. From the data-
set, we know for each shopping trip whether the shopper was a male or female. 
Denote by  α the fraction of times the shopping was done by a male. Next, we define 
conc as  2 · max { α, 1 − α} − 1 . As such, conc equals 0 if half of the shopping trips 
were conducted by the household male head and half by the household female head. 
It equals one if all shopping was done by the same person. We use this variable to 
see whether households where the shopping is done by mostly the same person have 
a higher predictive success.
The results are given in Table 3. The coefficients for the variables female college, 
pshopage, and conc are not statistically significantly different from 0 for any of the 
models (at the 10 percent level) and their signs vary among the different models of 
limited consideration. The dummy for male college has a somewhat positive effect 
on the predictive success of the GARP model. On the other hand, the dummy for 
income has a negative effect on the predictive success of the GARP model but has 
a positive sign for the models with limited consideration although the effect is not 
statistically significant.
The variable pshopage also seems to have a negative effect on the value of SPI. 
In other words, the older the age of the household member who goes shopping the 
better the fit with the standard GARP test.
Figure 1. Goodness of Fit
Notes: Panel A: kernel density estimation for the Afriat critical cost efficiency index. Panel B: 
kernel density estimation for the SPI index. The left density is obtained using households 
that violate GARP. The right densities is obtained from the sample of households that violate 
GARP but satisfy LARP.
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Importantly, the coefficient for the household size variable, hhsize, is negative 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for all models with limited con-
sideration. In other words, households with more members appear to have a lower 
predictive success for limited consideration models. However, there seems to be no 
statistically significant effect on the predictive success of the GARP test. In addi-
tion, a larger household size tends to lower the value of the SPI which means that the 
datasets of larger households come closer to passing the standard GARP test. A pos-
sible explanation for these findings could be that multimember households use a dif-
ferent decision making model instead of the utility maximization model maintained 
in this paper. Indeed, parts of the household decision literature argue that multi-per-
son household consumption behavior differs from a single decision maker that opti-
mizes a household utility function; see, for example, Fortin and Lacroix (1997), 
Browning and Chiappori (1998), and Cherchye and Vermeulen (2008). Intuitively, 
if different household members hold different subjective prices, the household need 
not satisfy the revealed preference conditions even if each individual shopper satis-
fies the conditions.
V. Conclusion
Models of consumer behavior on the basis of consideration sets impose weaker 
assumptions than the standard paradigm of utility maximization subject to a budget 
constraint. Consumers still maximize their consumption bundles given their utility 
functions and market prices, but they only consider a subset from the set of all avail-
able goods—the consideration set. To the best of our knowledge, we have presented 
and implemented the first revealed preference analysis for this consideration set 
consumption model.
Table 3—Linear Regression of Household Predictive Success on Observable 
Household Characteristics
 θ -LARP-T
GARP LARP  θ = 1.75 LARP-AP  θ ∗ 
Constant 0.0549 0.1206 0.1108 0.1483 1.3905
(0.0627) (0.0440) (0.0579) (0.1024) (0.0914)
pshopage −0.0007 −0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 −0.0022
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0012)
female college −0.0053 0.0043 0.0176 −0.0170 −0.0121
(0.0209) (0.0218) (0.0278) (0.0412) (0.0241)
male college 0.0392 −0.0200 0.0037 −0.0314 −0.0303
(0.0259) (0.0212) (0.0258) (0.0429) (0.0241)
income −0.0385 0.0174 0.0029 0.0221 0.0008
(0.0233) (0.0185) (0.0272) (0.0472) (0.0243)
hhsize −0.0107 −0.0277 −0.0300 −0.0250 −0.0229
(0.0083) (0.0061) (0.0075) (0.0136) (0.0075)
conc 0.01160 0.0193 0.0152 −0.0417 0.0222
(0.0390) (0.0305) (0.0375) (0.0626) (0.0353)
Notes: Regression output from household-level predictive success on household characteris-
tics. Heteroscedastic consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
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Without imposing any restrictions on the way consideration sets are formed, 
the revealed preference restrictions boil down to verifying an axiom that we call 
the Limited Axiom of Revealed Preference (LARP). In addition, we have derived 
two refined revealed preference tests that restrict the consideration set formation. 
Conceptually, the refined models impose stronger assumptions than LARP, but 
weaker assumptions than the standard GARP test.
We have applied our different revealed preference tests using a large dataset on 
household grocery consumption. The consideration set models have positive predic-
tive success and the refined models with endogenous consideration set formation 
appear to outperform GARP (and LARP). Thus, our paper provides empirical sup-
port for the consideration set models.
We see several avenues for follow-up research. First, up to now, there seems to 
be no universally accepted framework to model the formation of consideration sets. 
We see our paper, which presents models based on subjective prices, as a first step 
in that direction. Clearly, more theoretical and empirical work is needed in order to 
establish a unified theory of consideration set formation. In this respect, the revealed 
preference approach seems to be a promising way to obtain empirical tests and to 
compare the empirical performance of different models.
Second, in the empirical part, we have focused mainly on computing and com-
paring the pass-rate, power, and predictive success of the different models. In 
Sections III and IV, we have also introduced the SPI as a new goodness-of-fit mea-
sure and compared the correlation with the most well-known measure in the litera-
ture, the Afriat Critical Cost Efficiency Index (Afriat 1973). An interesting extension 
would be to see whether other measures such as the Varian index (Varian 1990), the 
Houtman-Maks index (Houtman and Maks 1985), or more recent measures sug-
gested by Echenique, Lee, and Shum (2011); Apesteguia and Ballester (2015); and 
Dean and Martin (2016) could also be applied or adapted to the revealed preference 
tests developed in this paper.
Finally, we have found that the empirical fit of the different consideration set mod-
els decreases with the size of the household. One possible explanation for the nega-
tive correlation between predictive success and household size is that multimember 
households may use a different decision-making model. Multimember households 
are composed of distinct individuals who are endowed with their own preferences. 
As a result, household consumption decisions will be determined by the specific 
intrahousehold decision mechanism that need not coincide with the standard unitary 
utility maximization model. A fruitful extension of our results would be to combine 
such collective models of household behavior with our model of consideration set 
formation. This extension could build upon our results and other existing revealed 
preference models for non-unitary models of household consumption behavior (see, 
among others, Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen 2007, 2009, 2011 and Cherchye, 
Demuynck, and De Rock 2011).
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Appendix A: Mathematical Appendix
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
 (←) .—Straightforward. 
 (→) .—Assume that  s is rationalizable with limited consideration and let  i t be 
the consideration sets that provide such a rationalization. Then there exists a utility 
function  u such that for all  t ∈ T ,
  q t ∈  arg max 
q
   u (q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t ,   q i = 0 ∀i ∉  i t . 
Since  J t ⊆  i t and  q t j = 0 for all  j ∈  i t \ J t , we obtain
  q t ∈  arg max 
q
   u (q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t ,   q i = 0 ∀i ∉  i t ,    q j = 0 ∀j ∈  i t \ J t ,
given that the last set of restrictions is not binding. The solution of this maximiza-
tion problem is identical to the solution of the problem
  max 
q
   u (q) subject to  p t q ≤  m t ,  q i = 0 ∀i ∉  J t .
Therefore, the sets  J t provide a rationalization with limited consideration. ∎
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
 (i) → (ii) .—Assume that the dataset is rationalizable with limited consideration. 
By Lemma 1, let  J t and  m t be the consideration sets and incomes that rationalize the 
dataset. Fix an equivalence class  E . If  v and  t belong to  E , we have  J v =  J t . Thus, 
the inequality  p t  q t ≥  p t  q v implies that  q v was feasible at observation  t , but not cho-
sen. Therefore, for any two observations  t, v in the same element  E of the partition,
  p t  q t ≥  p t  q v ⇒ u ( q t ) ≥ u ( q v ). 
If in addition  p t  q t >  p t  q v , there exists a bundle  q where  q >  q v , 
 q i = 0 ∀i ∉  J t , and  p t  q t ≥  p t q . By strict monotonicity of the utility function, we 
obtain  u( q t ) ≥ u(q) > u( q v ) . Thus, for any two observations  t and  v in the same 
element of the partition,
  p t  q t >  p t  q v ⇒ u ( q t ) > u ( q v ). 
By contradiction, assume  s violates LARP, i.e., at least one subdataset  { p t ,  q t } t∈E 
violates GARP. Then we have a sequence of observations  t, r, s, … , w, v such that
  p t  q t ≥  p t  q r ,  p r  q r ≥  p r  q s , … ,  p w  q w ≥  p w  q v and  p v  q v >  p v  q t . 
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However, by the reasoning in the first part of this proof, we obtain
  u ( q t ) ≥ u ( q r ) ≥ u( q s ) ≥ ⋯ ≥ u ( q w ) ≥ u ( q v ) and u ( q v ) > u ( q t ), 
a contradiction.
 (ii) → (iii) .—Assume that  s =  { p t ,  q t } t∈T satisfies LARP. For all  t ∈ T , define 
the function  a t ( · ) :  핉 n → 핉 as
  a t (q) =  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 p t i  q i −  p t  q t + P  ∑ 
i∉ J t
 p t i  q i . 
Here,  P is set such that for all  v ∈ T , if  J v ⊈  J t , then  a t ( q v ) > 0 , i.e.,
  P >  max 
v,  J v ⊈ J t 
     p t  q t −  ∑ i∈ J t  
  p t i  q v i  _____________  ∑ i∉ J t    p t i  q v i . 
Such a value can always be found, given that the numerator is bounded and the 
denominator is strictly positive.
Now, consider a sequence  t, s, r, … , w, v . We will first show that if
  a t ( q s ) ≤ 0,  a s ( q r ) ≤ 0, … ,  a w ( q v ) ≤ 0 and  a v ( q t ) ≤ 0, 
then all inequalities are in fact equalities, i.e., all these terms are equal to zero. By 
the definition of the functions  a t ( · ) above, this can only happen if
  J s ⊆  J t ,  J r ⊆  J s , … ,  J v ⊆  J w and  J t ⊆  J v . 
If not, by definition of  P , the functions take strictly positive values. Hence, all sets 
J t ,  J s ,  J r , … ,  J v are equal, i.e., the observations  t, r, s, … , v belong to the same 
partition. Therefore,
  a t ( q s ) =  p t  q s −  p t  q t ≤ 0,
  a s ( q r ) =  p s  q r −  p s  q s ≤ 0,
 … ,
  a v ( q t ) =  p v  q t −  p v  q v ≤ 0. 
Now, if one of these inequalities is a strict inequality, this would imply a violation 
of LARP. Therefore, all inequalities should be equalities, which we needed to show.
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Using the above property on the functions  a t ( · ) , we can invoke a result of Fostel, 
Scarf, and Todd (2004, section 2) that shows it is possible to find for all  t ∈ T , num-
bers  ϕ t ∈ 핉 and  λ t ∈  핉 ++ such that for all observations  t, v ∈ T ,
(1)  ϕ t −  ϕ v ≤  λ v  a v ( q t ). 
Setting  P t i = P ·  p t i establishes  (iii) .
 (iii) ↔ (iv) .—This is evident from the equivalence between  (ii) and  (iii) in 
Theorem 1.
 (iii) → (v) .—Consider the “utility” function
  u (q) =  min 
t∈T 
  { ϕ t +  λ t  a t (q)}. 
First of all, this function is strictly monotone and continuous (given that  a t (q) is 
continuous and strictly monotone in  q ). In fact, the function is concave (given that 
a t (q) is linear and and the  min operator preserves concavity). Also, we immediately 
have that
  u ( q t ) ≤  ϕ t +  λ t  a t ( q t ) =  ϕ t .
Let us show that this inequality is in fact an equality. Towards a contradiction, 
assume that  u( q t ) <  ϕ t . Then there exists an observation  v such that
  u( q t ) =  ϕ v +  λ v  a v ( q t ) <  ϕ t 
  ⇔  ϕ t −  ϕ v >  λ v  a v ( q t ). 
However, this contradicts the inequalities in  (iii) . As such, we see that for all  t , 
 u( q t ) =  ϕ t .
Finally, let us show that this utility function provides a rationalization with lim-
ited attention. For all  t , set  i t =  J t and  m t =  p t  q t . Now, take any bundle  q that is 
feasible at observation  t , i.e.,  q i =  q i = 0 for all  i ∉  J t and  p t q ≤  m t =  p t  q t . 
Then, by definition,
  u(q′ ) ≤  ϕ t +  λ t  a t (q)
 =  ϕ t +  λ t  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 p t i  q i −  λ t  p t  q t +  λ t  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 P t i  q i 
 =  ϕ t +  λ t ( p t q −  p t  q t )
 ≤  ϕ t = u ( q t ), 
which needed to be shown.
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 (v) → (i) .—Straightforward. ∎
PROOF OF COROLLARy 1:
 (→) .—Assume that  s is rationalizable with subjective prices. Then there is a 
utility function  u such that
  q t ∈ arg max u (q) subject to  ∑ 
i∈ i t 
 p t i  q i +  ∑ 
i∉ i t 
 P t i  q i ≤  m t .
From Theorem 1, it follows that  { P ̃ t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP, where  P ̃ t  j =  p t j if  j ∈  i t 
and  P ̃ t  j =  P t j otherwise.
Let us show that there exists a vector  
_
 Pt such that  { _ Pt ,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP 
and  
_
 P t j =  p t j if  j ∈  J t . If
  ∑ 
i∈ i t 
 p 
t
 j  q 
t
 j +  ∑ 
i∉ i t 
 P t j  q t j ≥  ∑ 
i∈ i t 
 p 
t
 j  q v j +  ∑ 
i∉ i t 
 P t j  q v j
  ⇔  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 p 
t
 j  q 
t
 j +  ∑ 
i∈ i t \ J t 
  p 
t
 j  q 
t
 j +  ∑ 
i∉ i t 
 P t j  q t j ≥  ∑ 
i∈ i t 
 p 
t
 j  q v j +  ∑ 
i∈ i t \ J t 
  p t j  q v j +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 P t j  q v j .
Now, set  
_
 P t j =  p t j if  j ∈  J t ,  
_
 P t j =  p t j if  j ∈  i t \ J t , and  
_
 P t j =  P t j if  j ∉  i t . Then,
  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 _ P t j  q t j +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 _ P t j  q t j ≥  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 _ P t j  q v j +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 _ P t j  q v j .
Therefore, we see that  { _ Pt  j,  q t } t∈T must also satisfy GARP. Using Theorem 2, we see 
that the dataset satisfies LARP.
 (←) .—If LARP is satisfied, by Theorem 2, there exists a price vector 
 P t ∈  핉 ++ n such that  { P t,  q t } t∈T satisfies GARP and  P t j =  p t j if  q t j > 0 . Then, from 
Theorem 1, we know that there exists a utility function such that,
  q t =  arg max 
q
   u (q) subject to  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 p t i  q t i +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 P t i  q i ≤  m t .
Setting  i t =  J t shows that this dataset is also rationalizable with subjective prices. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Assume that,  q t is (strictly) revealed preferred to  q v according to the prices  
_
 Pt :
  ∑ 
i
  _ P t i  q t i ≥ (>)  ∑ 
i
  _ P t i  q v i
 ⇔  ∑ 
i
  _ P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) ≥ (>) 0 .
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Then, we obtain
  0 ≤ (<)  ∑ 
i
  _ P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) 
  =  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 _ P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 _ P t i  (0 −  q v i) 
 ≤  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 P t i  (0 −  q v i) 
   =  ∑ 
i∈ J t 
 P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) +  ∑ 
i∉ J t 
 P t i  ( q t i −  q v i) . 
This shows that  q t is also (strictly) revealed preferred to  q v according to the prices 
P t . As such, if  { _ Pt,  q t } t∈T violates GARP, then  { P t,  q t } t∈T should also violate GARP 
which needed to be shown.
Let  
_
 p =  1 __T  ∑ t∈T   p t be the vector of average prices. We assume that the subjec-
tive prices  P t are such that  P t ≤ θ _ p, for some fixed number  θ ≥ 1 . ∎
Appendix B: Additional Results
Table B1 provides the bounds (ub: upper bound and lb: lower bound) of the 
95 percent confidence intervals for the difference between the predictive success 
of the different models, i.e., the predictive success of the model in a row minus the 
predictive success of the corresponding model of the column. For example, the CI 
for the difference in predictive success of GARP minus the predictive success of 
LARP is  [− 0.0663, − 0.0222] . We refer to Demuynck (2015) for the construction 
of these bounds.
Table B1—Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals for Difference between Predictive Success  
of the Different Models
θ-LARP-T
LARP θ = 1.25 1.5 1.75 2 2.25 LARP-AP
GARP lb −0.0663 −0.0794 −0.0937 −0.0928 −0.0872 −0.0828 −0.0939
ub −0.0222 −0.0081 −0.0370 −0.0419 −0.0399 −0.0370 −0.0245
LARP lb −0.0318 −0.0407 −0.0371 −0.0285 −0.0224 −0.0477
ub 0.0328 −0.0014 −0.0091 −0.0101 −0.0089 0.0178
θ−LARP−T
θ = 1.25 lb −0.0539 −0.0566 −0.0527 −0.0489 −0.0548
ub 0.0107 0.0094 0.0131 0.0166 0.0238
θ = 1.5 lb −0.0191 −0.0167 −0.0135 −0.0291
ub 0.0150 0.0203 0.0243 0.0413
θ = 1.75 lb −0.0072 −0.0048 −0.0264
ub 0.0148 0.0197 0.0426
θ = 2 lb −0.0024 −0.0288
ub 0.0097 0.0374
θ = 2.25 lb −0.0322
ub 0.0336
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Appendix C: Sample Construction
 1. The raw dataset has 957,570 transactions (indexed by  t ) on 2,100 households 
(indexed by  j ) for 15,890 distinct products (with different UPC, indexed 
by  i ).
 2. First, we drop the observations of April 1995 as these only include a single 
day. This leaves 956,064 transactions.
 3. For each transaction  t , household  j , and good  i , the raw dataset provides us 
with the total expenditure  e ijt and total quantity bought  q ijt . We aggregate over 
months defining expenditures  e ijm and quantities  q ijm for household  j for good 
i over month  m by
  e ijm =  ∑ 
t∈m  e ijt ,
  q ijm =  ∑ 
t∈m  q ijt .
  This leaves a total of 743,051 transactions. We also define total quantity per 
good  i over the month  m as
  q im =  ∑ 
j
  q ijm .
 4. In order to have reliable price information for missing transactions, we 
remove observations for which  q im is below 20. This leaves 348,022 transac-
tions over 2,026 distinct goods.
 5. We define price per good per period per household  p ijm by
  p ijm =   e ijm  ____ q ijm .
 6. For each UPC  i and month  m , we also define an average price,
  p im =  1 ___  T im  ∑ j  p ijm ,
  where  T im is the total number of households that buy good  i in month  m .
 7. We impose a panel structure by creating an observation  t for each  i, j , and 
m for which  q ij m ′  > 0 for at least one month  m′ . This gives us a total of 
4,230,954 observations.
 8. If we have no transaction for some combination of  ijm in this dataset (i.e., 
household  j did not consume good  i in month  m ), we set  q ijm = 0 and 
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 p ijm =  p im , i.e., the missing prices are set to be equal to the average price 
among all transactions for this UPC during the month  m .
 9. We drop observations  ijm where  p ijm is not defined for some time period  m′ (i.e., no household bought good  i during some month). This leaves 1,219,887 
observations.
 10. We drop households  j that have zero total consumption for some month  m , 
i.e., where  ∑ i   q ijm = 0 for some  m . This leaves 453,951 observations on 
550 households (  j ) and 124 goods ( i ) over 27 months ( m ).
 11. The final dataset gives us a balanced panel (over 27 periods) for 550 house-
holds. The number of goods per household is on average 30.57 (standard 
deviation is 10.69) with a median of 30, first quartile of 23, and third quartile 
of 37.
 12. Eighty-four percent of these observations ( i, j, m ) have zero consumption, 
q ijm = 0 .
 13. On average, 84 percent of household transactions are zero (standard devia-
tion is 0.0478). The median fraction of zero transactions is 0.84, with first 
quartile 0.81 and third quartile 0.87. 
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